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Abstract
This paper presents a model of endogenous bias in rules of price adjustment that allows
one to analyse the behaviour of inflation and output continuously throughout the entire
spectrum of rationality, from one end to the other. Specifically, it proposes an alternative
microfoundation for both the New Keynesian sticky-price and the sticky-information Phillips
Curve by considering a possibility where price setters are constrained by the length of the
time horizon  over which they can form rational expectations, and they use the growth of
past prices at the rate of the central bank’s inflation target as a heuristic alternative in place
of their own expectations beyond this horizon. Three interesting results emerge. Firstly,
how price setters form inflation expectations and whether these expectations are accurate
or heterogeneous do not matter when they are able to gather information or change prices
more frequently. Secondly, should policymakers expect private agents to similarly adopt the
inflation target as a nominal anchor for their own expectations, then even the choice of this
numerical target could prove to be pivotal to output stabilization. Thirdly, larger degrees of
bounded rationality increase the persistence of inflation, and, under sticky-information, raise
the possibility of discontinuous jumps and oscillatory dynamics of inflation and real output.
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1 Introduction
Why does the relationship between inflation and output weaken, and what exactly is the role
of inflation expectations? The fact that these are sometimes unclear poses a challenge to the
microfoundations of the new Keynesian Phillips Curve (NPKC). While reflecting on Milton
Friedman’s influential 1967 presidential address to the American Economic Association that
set the stage for rational expectations (RE), Mankiw and Reis (2017) recognized the growing
tendency within the profession to lean away from this workhorse model and towards other forms
that do not impose such a demanding assumption, at least in the short run. Perhaps one might
speculate that a more robust model of expectations could potentially be found at the interaction
between new Keynesian economics and behavioural economics, given a more realistic portrayal
of the economic agent.
This, however, is not a new endeavour. Rather than follow the new Keynesian microfoundation
that proposes a purely forward-looking inflation dynamics model (Coibion, Gorodnichenko and
Kamdar, 2017), Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) introduced a model where agents are simultaneously
forward and backward-looking and Milani (2005) explored a behaviour of Bayesian learning.
Ball (2000) further examined a near-rationality model of price adjustment where agents have
rational inattention, and they pay attention only to information on inflation and nothing else
when forming their expectations. These are all ‘behavioural models’ to model the NPKC more
realistically1 by relaxing the demanding assumption of rational expectations, especially when
omniscient price setters are rare. In fact, this is the motivation behind the theory of sticky-
information. Proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002) to replace the sticky-price model, they
model the cost of information gathering into rules of price adjustment and finds that the sticky-
information Phillips Curve is capable of producing inflation and output dynamics that are more
consistent with U.S. data.
This paper acts on this foundation to present a model of endogenous bias in dynamic price
adjustment where price setters without rational expectations rely on the central bank’s inflation
target as a heuristic anchor. It is therefore a novel attempt to present a model of inflation
expectations where agents in this model look to the central bank for their own optimal pricing
behaviour when their rationality is bounded. There is thus a bias, endogenous to the agent,
whenever there is a departure from what prices would be set optimally under rational expec-
tations. This paper will endeavour to use Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) three judgment
1Fuhrer and Moore (1995) showed that this canonical model is empirically inconsistent with inflation persistence
and Ball (1994a) showed that it is theoretically challenged by the disinflationary boom.
heuristics - representativeness, availability and anchoring - to justify such a form of heuristic
behaviour when agents depart from rational expectations, and hence, attempts to introduce a
channel to which behavioural economics may impact dynamic responses of inflation and output.
Therefore, it approaches the literature on Phillips Curves from a different angle. The conjecture
for the model is as follows:
Price setters maximize utility by forming rational expectations of their future desired adjustment
price as much as they can, until they are constrained by the time horizon () beyond which they
can no longer form such expectations due to its increasingly complex nature. They subsequently
use the growth of past prices at the rate2 of the inflation target as a heuristic alternative in place
of their own expectations beyond this horizon. In other words, their expectation Et(P
∗
t++1)
3
is replaced with Pt−1(1 + ⇡
T )+2, with ⇡T being the notation for the central bank’s inflation
target.
While there could be many constraints that prevent monopolistic firms from forming rational
expectations in reality, this paper focuses only on the length of the forecast horizon over which
one is able to do so. The motivation here lies in a somewhat odd mismatch between empirical and
theoretical macroeconomics: there have been many papers (such as Gavin and Mandal (2001),
Mankiw, Wolfers and Reis (2003) and Jonung and Linde´n (2010)) written on the heterogeneity
of expectations or some biases in inflation forecasts over different time periods (or even over a
period of 12 months) that present clear evidence against the unbounded forecast horizon. Yet,
most of the theoretical work on models of inflation expectations continue to use some discounted
affine function of forecast horizons that sum to infinity. How does the Phillips Curve behave
when this is no longer the case? This paper thus stands in contrast with the approach taken
by current literature, which is to discount the importance4 of expectations further ahead by
assigning geometrically declining weights to expectations formed into perpetuity. By further
relaxing the standard definition of an omniscient homo economicus, this paper subsequently
explores a microfoundation established by price setters who rely on heuristic principles to ‘reduce
the complex tasks’ of assessing their future expectations of prices, which, although will not be
a precise estimate, is the best they can do given that they have ‘bounded’ or ‘procedural’
rationality (Simon, 1978).
2Or perhaps even at some multiple of the inflation target, as section II will show that the model can be easily
adapted.
3P ∗t+j = Pt+j + ↵Yt+j . P
∗
t+j is the firm’s desired price at period t + j. This implies that firms raise prices in
times of booms and lower them during recessions, with 0 < ↵ < 1 representing some real rigidities.
4Expectations of what the firm’s desired prices would be in the far future is less important than those in the
near future as the firm gets to update their prices periodically.
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This proposed heuristic principle is a hybrid that incorporates two recent progresses in both
behavioural and monetary economics, and the design is anything but arbitrary. Firstly, the rule
is motivated in part by Gabaix’s (2014) sparsity-based utility-maximization model where agents
build simplified models of understanding the world, but replaces certain parameters which they
are unable to acquire due to their cognitive limits or costs of mental processing. However, I take
an alternative approach by using the time horizon as a basis of the agent’s reparameterization in
an attempt to align the model more closely with how a rational agent would behave in the world
through the eyes of Kahneman and Tversky. Hence, this contains traces of Gal´ı and Gertler’s
(1999) simultaneously forward and backward-looking model, except that agents are backward-
looking in expectation that some past prices will grow at the rate of the inflation target and
therefore can be used an appropriate reference point. Secondly, the rule further reasons that
since most central banks have adopted inflation targets into their loss functions5 and forward
guidance has become a recent hallmark of monetary policy, it would be rational for agents to
set prices using the central bank’s inflation target as a nominal anchor when their inflation
expectations are uncertain. In fact, this is as if one is using the inflation target to solve the
famous time inconsistency problem, except through the lens of price setters at a micro level.
As the paper will show subsequently, the role of the inflation target in the proposed rule of
price adjustment becomes crucial in stabilizing inflation and output in the presence of realistic
monetary policy shocks. By modelling the inflation target into the rule of the price adjustment,
the Phillips Curve now becomes an explicit function of the central bank’s credibility. The
following subsection provides a more thorough justification for the proposed pricing heuristic.
Acknowledging the progress made by both sides of the profession, this paper derives a framework
that may be capable of analyzing the dynamics of inflation and output continuously throughout
the entire spectrum of rationality, from one end to the other depending on the severity of the bias.
This is how the paper hopes to contribute to existing literature. To derive this framework, this
paper incorporates the rule of price adjustment into Calvo’s (1983) staggered-pricing model and
Mankiw and Reis’ (2002) sticky-information model, as both are the two more widely embraced
models of inflation expectations (Dupor, Kitamura and Tsuruga, 2006). While the sticky-
price model is flawed, it serves as a useful benchmark when one ventures to depart from full
rational expectations. The sticky-information model, on the other hand, provides a more realistic
foundation to study what happens if agents have constraints that prevent them from acquiring
rational expectations even if they are able to gather information costlessly. In fact, this paper
is a departure from the theory of sticky-information. Both models will subsequently be used to
5See Svensson (1996), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) with regards to the efficacy of the inflation target as a
solution to the inflation bias problem.
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study the role of endogenous bias on a gradient going from a strict to semi-strict RE model.
By writing the proposed rule of price adjustment into both of these models, this paper will show
in section II that it is possible to derive models of both Phillips Curves that are now explicit
functions of both  and the central bank’s inflation target. Each value of  can subsequently
be mapped into a specific dynamic path and an impulse response function for prices. These will
be used in section III to study the behaviour of inflation and output in response to exogenous
shocks. In order to compare the results to some benchmark where  is initially infinity, this paper
will model the exact same shocks used by Mankiw and Reis (2002) and study the deviation in
behaviour when  decreases from infinity. I subsequently study these dynamics when  is initially
zero and when it increases from zero. Monetary policy shocks will be used to motivate the role of
the inflation target. Section IV examines the theory further by studying the interactions between
 and the initial parameters in both the sticky-price and sticky-information model, and hence
develops the framework fully. Ultimately, this framework hopes to answer two questions: Firstly,
if the current full-rationality model of expectations leaves one with some gaps in understanding
the curious relationship between inflation and output, can one better do so by surveying this
relationship from the other end of bounded rationality? Secondly, supposing that is possible to
do so, can these new Keynesian models of inflation be used as a vehicle for behavioural economics
to inform monetary policy in any way? Summarizing the results from the impulse responses and
using them to comment on these two questions, section V concludes.
1.1 Motivations for proposed design of price adjustment
One might be tempted to ask: why might price setters use the growth of past prices at the
rate of the inflation target as a heuristic alternative for their own expectations of future price
levels? When they form future expectations Et(P
∗
t+j) to as far as they can until they become
constrained by the time horizon , why not set all Et(P
∗
t+) = Et(P
∗
t++1) to be a constant
function, rather than being backward-looking and set Pt−1(1+⇡
T )+2 = Et(P
∗
t++1)? Do homo
sapiens alternate from system 2 to system 1 once some threshold (such as ) has been reached?
To be sure, there are many different ways in which one can model how expectations are formed
and how prices are set conditioned on these expectations. In most cases, such as the theory of
sticky-information or sticky-prices, the model rests on a core assumption that price setters are
constrained by some exogenous variation that deter them from forming rational expectations of
some unknown price vector. Under sticky-information, for instance, this arises from the slow
rate of information diffusion. In proposing the behaviour described above, this paper claims that
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the length of the time period ahead which one intends to form expectations over is a appropriate
internal constraint, which, similar to the exogenous constraints, is equally capable of preventing
one from forming rational expectations, even if one has information or the opportunity to change
prices. The focus, however, is to motivate an alternative behaviour to circumvent this constraint.
To do so, one might venture into fields of psychology, behavioural economics and finance where
there have been overwhelming evidences that persistently distinguished homo economicus from
homo sapiens (Lo, 2013). In their 1974 magnum opus “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases”, Tversky and Kahneman laid out three different judgment heuristics that capture
how homo sapiens would likely behave under certain circumstances. Paraphrasing using their
own words (italicized), these are:
1. Representativeness: in which probabilities are assessed by the degree to which A resem-
bles B. If A represents B or is a subset of B, and price setters know the probability of B
occurring at each period, then they can infer what the probability of A occurring is.
2. Availability: in which probabilities are assessed by the probability of past events or the
ease to which similar occurrences can be brought to mind.
3. Adjustment from an anchor: in which probabilities are assessed by making estimates
starting from an initial value, that might be the result of some partial computation.
Can one contextualize these judgment heuristics in the microfoundations of dynamic price ad-
justment to motivate the behavioural rule? It would perhaps be appropriate to do so if the
behavioural model is centered upon some degree of backward-lookingness. This is a rational
course of action for the price-setter, who, in lacking the cognitive tools to navigate the com-
plexity that is ahead of him, turns to his experience or the information contained in some
realized prices as a guide. In fact, this paper takes the view that Tversky and Kahneman’s
set of judgment heuristics (henceforth TKC) are relevant only if price setters are allowed to be
backward-looking. This provides the justification for using past prices, one period before6 as a
heuristic instrument.
Consider using the TKC to evaluate the following: is Et(p
∗
t+) representative of Et(p
∗
t++1)?
This could be true, especially if prices are sticky and are unlikely to change between an interval
of one period. Then, one might argue that one’s expectation Et(p
∗
t+) is as good as Et(p
∗
t++1).
However, the strength of this argument weakens if one were to argue that Et(p
∗
t+) is as good as
6Assume that price setters only refer to prices realized one period before as this vector contains the most recent
information about the state of the economy.
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{Et(p
∗
t++1)...Et(p
∗
t++q)} 8 q 2 (1,1) because the approximation of expectation over the price
vector between two periods that are longer apart begins to fail: even if the central bank targets
a zero inflation rate such that price levels remain constant, it is possible that the economy could
be hit with a shock in the future that is unobserved at time t.
In comparison, using Pt−1(1+⇡
T )+2 as a representation for Et(p
∗
t++1) is a better approximation
if one were to assume that price setters demonstrate satisficing behaviour by seeking to minimize
their mean squared errors (MSE) of price forecast rather than seeking to target the price level
perfectly: rather than exercise their discretion in forming forecasts, which may be inconsistent
to the literature on rational inattention, they simply follow a rule that suggests raising prices by
the rate of the inflation target. For price setters who are unable to observe P ∗t+j and hence form
expectations Et(P
∗
t+j), it is a rational alternative to believe that
P ∗t+j
P ∗t
= (1+⇡T )j , especially since
P ∗t+j is the aggregate price level that the central bank indirectly targets through the inflation
target. This is further appropriate if the time horizon  over which price setters are able to form
rational expectations is long enough such that the eventual realized inflation beyond this period
is close to the target. Then, the justification for this rule simply rests on having the central
bank to be credible. Implicitly, this proposes a case of profit-satisficing for the price-setter that
occurs whenever the central bank minimizes its loss function.
Here, price setters know that past, realized prices one period before is not a perfect anchor for
them to form expectation of some prices in the future. However, this does not matter to them
insofar as over the long run both converges. For example, Pt−1(1 + ⇡
T )+2 is mathematically a
linear trend extrapolated off a point Pt−1 from the business cycle, with  on the x-axis. Then,
depending on whether Pt−1 lies on a peak or the trough, this extrapolated trend could either
be above or below the actual trend. This, however, is not a concern to our price setters, who
instead only care about their long run convergence. This requires the assumption that the
inflation target is set to be equal to the long run average growth rate of prices, and so having
prices to grow at the rate of the inflation target regardless of its position at the business cycle
will allow for convergence to the mean. This, is satisficing behaviour. Setting Et(p
∗
t+) as an
approximation for {Et(p
∗
t++1)...Et(p
∗
t++q)} risks resulting in the two abovementioned trends
diverging forever, with the peril here being the argument that price setters are willing to tolerate
such a large mean squared error (MSE).
What about the criteria of availability under TKC? How do one assess the probability of prices?
But once one realizes that this is but a matter of inflation forecasting, the question becomes:
how often do the same (or certain) rates of inflation occur, over how many time periods and what
is its associated mean and variance? These questions matter because persistence of inflation is
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likely to be representative: to forecast what inflation will be tomorrow, one can simply refer to
the past for answers. If this is so, then Pt−1 naturally becomes a suitable factor in the forecast
of P ∗t+. Furthermore, this paper is inclined to take the view that it is the mean of inflation that
matters to price setters more, rather than its variability. There are two good reasons established
on the grounds of satisficing behaviour once again: (1) forecasting the long run average of
inflation of tomorrow ⇡¯t+1 is easier than forecasting a point estimate ⇡t+1 and (2) given rational
inattention, it is unlikely that price setters will actively gather all associated information on the
economy in an attempt to precisely forecast inflation. Then, given (1) and (2), price setters
actually do not need to bother with inflation forecasts if they can equate the mean of inflation
with the inflation target over the medium to long run! This is not a thoroughly demanding
assumption, especially since the hallmark of monetary policy today lies in the central bank’s
commitment to keep prices low and stable. With these premises, price setters expect past prices
Pt−1 to grow at the rate of the inflation target on average, and this becomes an approximation
for Et(p
∗
t+k+1).
For practical reasons, setting Pt−1(1+⇡
T )+2 = Et(P
∗
t++1) may even allow for richer dynamics
of the impulse responses which could be extremely helpful in demonstrating the theory. If
one were to instead pursue an alternative where the price setter forms expectations for as far
as he can and fixes them for the subsequent horizon beyond which he can no longer form
expectations, this may be no different from the benchmark case of price adjustment under full
rational expectations, with the exception of having the price adjustment rule being split into its
usual Calvo summation of expected prices and some constant. One may thus expect the impulse
responses under this alternative to be of little difference when compared to the benchmark.
2 Reparameterizing the Phillips Curve with κ
2.1 Deriving a model of the sticky-price new Keynesian Phillips Curve with
bounded rationality
I begin by modifying the microfoundation of Calvo’s (1983) staggered-pricing model using the
proposed rule of price adjustment explained in the introduction. In this original model, oppor-
tunity to change prices arrive stochastically at a rate of  , where 0     1. When price setters
have the opportunity to change prices, they set their adjustment price Xt
7 to be equal to some
7All prices Pt, adjustment price Xt and money Mt are expressed in logs throughout this paper.
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weighted average of current and expected optimal prices P ∗t+j in the future as follows:
Xt =  
∞X
j=0
(1   )jEt(P
∗
t+j) (1)
Observe that the adjustment price at period t is purely a function of expectations formed today
of what the future desired price will be in perpetuity. This presupposes that the price setter is
capable of forming expectations over any time horizon, however long it is. I relax this demanding
assumption and propose that the price setter does not have such capabilities. Instead, I propose
that they behave like rational agents and form rational expectations of their desired prices as
much as possible, until they reach a process where they can no longer do so as a result of their
cognitive limits. Hence, the rule of price adjustment is rewritten in the following manner:
Xt =  
X
j=0
(1   )jEt(P
∗
t+j) +  
∞X
j=+1
(1   )jPt−1(1 + ⇡
T )j+1 (2)
Under this rule, price setters can only form rational expectations of what their desired prices
P ∗t are over a time horizon that is  periods long, and they use the growth of past prices at
the rate of the central bank’s inflation target as a heuristic alternative in place of their own
expectations beyond this horizon. Observe that this rule is not a complete deviation away from
Calvo’s model. It continues to presuppose that price setters behave in a forward-looking manner
as much as they can. In fact, it requires them to be strictly forward-looking for as long as the
time horizon over which they form expectations is within their cognitive boundaries. This rule
also assumes credibility of the central bank in order to substantiate the choice of ⇡T as an anchor
for inflation. This is thus a departure from how current literature has approached the issue (see
Afrouzi and Yang (2016), Milani (2005) and Gal´ı and Gertler (1999)). This microfoundation
further suggests that some backward-looking behaviour only exists for some , and the position
of  in turn determines the geometric weights that past prices have in setting prices today.
As with Calvo’s original staggered-pricing model, aggregate prices Pt today continue to be a
weighted average of all prices that firms have set in the past:
Pt =  
∞X
j=0
(1   )jXt−j (3)
Using the law of iterated expectations and rearranging the algebra, which I leave to the appendix,
it is possible to combine equations (2) and (3) to obtain the following model of inflation:
⇡t =
↵ 2
1   (1   )
Yt +
1   
1   (1   )
Et(⇡t+1) +
  
2
1   (1   )
Pt (4)
such that
  =
 (1   )+1(1 + ⇡T )+2
   ⇡T (1   )
(5)
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For the rest of this paper, I refer to equation (4) as the -augmented sticky-price Phillips Curve.
On an a priori basis, this model of staggered pricing suggests that output gaps and expectations
may contribute less to inflation depending on the size of  . An important point to note here
is that this modified Phillips Curve is in fact nested in the original model: if   is 0, the
-augmented model reduces to the canonical sticky-price model given by:
⇡t =
↵ 2
1   
Yt + Et(⇡t+1) (6)
When will   be equal to 0? If one were to make the strict assumption that   6=1, then the
value of   as 0 can never be obtained by having   = 1. This is a reasonable assumption, given
that opportunity for price adjustment almost never arrives with full certainty at each period.
As such, the value of   now becomes contingent on the value of . Then, observe that as 
increases to1, (1  )+1 geometrically declines faster then (1+⇡T )+2 increases. This holds if
one were to assume that   > ⇡T , which is a suitable assumption to make. With inflation targets
of most central banks centered arbitrarily at 2%,    ⇡T suggests that firms change prices less
than once every 50 quarters! This is a rather absurd assumption. For now, this paper will
endeavour to defer a more thorough discussion on the role of the inflation target ⇡T to section
3.5, where shocks to monetary policy are analysed in a setting where private agents respond by
forming expectations using the inflation target as a nominal anchor. Hence, one might as well
treat ⇡T tentatively as zero.8 As long as   > ⇡T ,   reduces to 0 for a large enough  as shown
by taking the limits:
lim
→∞
 (1   )+1(1 + ⇡T )+2
   ⇡T (1   )
= 0 (7)
This result must necessarily hold. Having  to be equal to 1 essentially brings one back to the
workhorse model where price setters are able to form expectations over an indefinite period, and
hence, equation (4) must revert back to (6).
By incorporating the bias in the rule of price adjustment, the canonical Phillips Curve is now an
explicit function of both  (and the inflation target ⇡T ), which in turn determines the extent to
which output gaps and expectations contribute to inflation. This provides a theoretical model
to analyse the behaviour of inflation when  ranges from zero from one end of spectrum to 1
at the other. Should price setters have a shorter horizon over which they can compute rational
expectations, the role of inflation expectations and output matter less for actual inflation today
as a significant share of the price-setting rule is accounted for by the use of heuristics. What may
be of greater interest is the additional Pt term that now features in the sticky-price model. As
section III will show, this changes the solution for a dynamic path of prices. One can immediately
8As section III will illustrate, zero is a suitable parameter value for ⇡T also due to the fact that the path of
money Mt (either in levels or in growth rates) is set to zero ex-post to the exogenous shocks.
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infer that inflation and output dynamics under the -augmented model will deviate from those
of the benchmark as long as  6= 1.
2.2 Deriving a model of the sticky-information Phillips Curve with bounded
rationality
As an alternative proposal to replace the sticky-price model, Mankiw and Reis (2002) writes a
model of price adjustment where the rate of information arrival,  , is slow. As not everyone
receives the most updated information about the state of the economy, only a fraction updates
their prices optimally and the rest continue to set prices based on past information. This assumes
that whenever price setters acquires information, they behave in a manner that is consistent with
rational expectations. The price adjustment rule of the benchmark follows:
Xt = Et−j(P
∗
t ) (8)
With aggregate price levels being a weighted average of all prices in the economy:
Pt =  
∞X
j=0
(1   )jEt−j(P
∗
t ) (9)
This model of price adjustment motivates a microfoundation where price setters still form ra-
tional expectations, but these are expectations formed ex-ante to the information that arrives
later. However, depending on the rate of information arrival, price setters may have to rely on
some expectations that were formed at the beginning of time. Like Calvo’s staggered-pricing
model, this presupposes that there are no bounds to the horizon over which expectations are
formed. Applying the same behavioural conjecture, this assumption is relaxed and replaced with
the following:
Xt =
8><
>:
Et−j(P
∗
t ) if j  
Pt−j(1 + ⇡
T )j if j > 
Similar to the microfoundation of the -augmented sticky-price model, this rule of price adjust-
ment suggests that price setters anchor themselves on the inflation target as a guide to how
prices would grow in the future. What is different here is the recency of past prices that price
setters choose as a reference point. Here, the sticky-information model differs from the sticky-
price model in the past expectations matter for inflation today, rather than future expectations.
As a result, only prices occurring a period before the most outdated expectation represent the
next-best knowledge that the price setter has about the state of the economy. This results in
an adaptive behaviour that is more backward-looking into the past as compared to that for
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the -augmented sticky-price model. With this rule of price adjustment, overall prices in the
economy are then pinned down by the following:
Pt =  
X
j=0
(1   )jEt−j(P
∗
t ) +  
∞X
j=+1
(1   )jPt−j(1 + ⇡
T )j (10)
With some tedious algebra, which I once again leave to the appendix, inflation can now be
expressed as:
⇡t = (
↵ 
1   
)Yt +  
X
j=0
(1   )jEt−j−1(⇡t + ↵∆Yt)
+  
∞X
j=+1
(1   )j(1 + ⇡T )j
✓
⇡t−j + (
 
1   
)Pt−j
◆
(11)
For the rest of this paper, I refer equation (11) as the -augmented sticky-information Phillips
Curve. By and large, this model of inflation resembles the benchmark sticky-information model.
Inflation today is a result of some output gap, sum of past inflation expectations formed up
to  periods into the past and some past inflation and prices realized more than  + 1 periods
ago in the past. Crucially, past expectations of current inflation only matter until a certain
time horizon  + 1 from the past (with a lower bound defined by t      1) whereas they
extend back to the beginning of time in the benchmark. This is consistent with the bias under
bounded rationality, where price setters are only permitted rational expectations over a limited
time horizon. Beyond this horizon, what matters more for inflation today is past inflation. As
a result, this model of price adjustment introduces inflation inertia and a variant of adaptive
inflation by design similar to Gal´ı and Gertler’s (2004) backward-looking rule of thumb model,
except that price setters in this model only turn to backward-looking behaviour conditionally
when they need to rely on the inflation target.
As the paper will show in section III, it is further useful to study the model dynamics by
considering the value of  at its extremes. Suppose =1. This is to say that price setters
can make forecasts of what optimal prices are over a time period that is infinitely large. This
behaviour thus implies the absence of any pricing bias. It is no surprise then, that equation
(11) reduces to the baseline model of the sticky-information Phillips Curve as all coefficients
(1    ) of past inflation ⇡t−j and past prices Pt−j−1 are raised to the power of infinity. Under
the assumption that   6=1 and   > ⇡T , the entire summation term of past inflation and price
variables become 0. This retrieves the benchmark model of sticky-information given by:
⇡t = (
↵ 
1   
)Yt +  
∞X
j=0
(1   )jEt−j−1(⇡t + ↵∆Yt) (12)
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On the other hand, suppose instead that =0. For the sticky-information model this suggests
the unique case where price setters can only form rational expectations for one period ahead:
⇡t = (
↵ 
1   
)Yt +  Et−1(⇡t + ↵∆Yt) +  
∞X
j=2
(1   )j(1 + ⇡T )j
✓
⇡t−j + (
 
1   
)Pt−j
◆
(13)
The reason that price setters continue to form expectations even when  = 0 lies in the theory
of sticky-information. Given that information arrives with a lag, the expectations formed over
one period ex-post to information arrival does not necessarily reflect the best state of knowledge.
In this aspect, price setters optimizes with a lag as well. Subsequently, equation (13) indicates
that past expectations of inflation only matter for inflation up to one period ago, and there is a
larger role assumed by adaptive inflation.
2.3 Motivations for proposed microfoundation
Up to this juncture, the paper has presented a variant of the Phillips curve motivated by both
sticky-prices and sticky-information under a set of behaviour that is discrete in motion: first, a
strictly forward-looking behaviour as one would expect in the benchmark full rational expecta-
tions model and second, some backward-looking rule of thumb with weights conditioned on the
time horizon . Here, this paper recognises that the assumption of full rational expectations
does not strictly require the price setter to form such expectations over an infinite time horizon,
as the adjustment process imposes weights on these expectations that geometrically decline to
zero anyway. This suggests that a working model does not require price setters to be able to
form such expectations over some horizon  such that  = 1. However, notice that the rule
of price adjustment proposed earlier attaches geometrically declining weights to the heuristic
term in a similar manner and therefore continues to give a non-trivial role to rational expec-
tations in this microfoundation. What is of a larger significance here is the inclusion of some
reference-dependent expectations that has long been identified as a cornerstone of loss-averse
utility functions. This would be relevant if one were to examine some utility function of price
setters who are loss averse9, such that they prefer to target some ‘general growth’ in price levels
than forming their own stochastic expectations. As Tversky and Kahneman (1991) famously
noted, one’s preferences change endogenously according to where the point of reference is. Why
not apply the same strand of thought to the formation of expectations? Surely as self-fulfilling
equilibriums of hyperinflation and deflations would show, the expectations that one forms of
prices are very much dependent on the nature of the environment that one is in. In this sense,
9See ‘A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences’ by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006).
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this paper has proposed the heuristic in the price adjustment rule to resemble some form of
adaptive behaviour.
In ‘Disagreement about inflation expectations ’, Mankiw et al. (2004) illustrated using 50 years
of survey data on median inflation expectations (12 months ahead) in the U.S. that a central
bias exists in the inflation forecasts by both professional economists and households, and there
is significant evidence to reject the claim of rational expectations for both. What is relevant to
this paper here is that knowing more about the economy - as one could claim about technocrats
- certainly does not help one in making better predictions. Therefore, motivating a theory of
bounded rationality in rules of price adjustment naturally builds on the literature and what the
profession has already learned about the formation of expectations. More importantly, perhaps
what is less agreed upon within the profession is the upper bound that  should take in place
of 1 in the workhorse model as a standard. Whether having such a standard is important, and
whether or not it matters if  is not modelled as 1 is precisely the goal of section III.
3 The dynamic behaviour of inflation and output un-
der varying degrees of price setter foresight
Having derived the -augmented Phillips Curves for both sticky-prices and sticky-information,
I examine the behaviours of inflation and output in the presence of macroeconomic shocks and
compare them to the results given by the baseline model as outlined by Mankiw and Reis
(2002). Note that the shocks are the same except for the introduction of an inflation target by
an independent central bank :
• Macroeconomic shock 1: an unexpected fall in the level of aggregate demand by 10% at
period 0. That is, Mt =  log(0.9) for t  0 and Mt = 0 for t   0. The inflation target ⇡
T
is unchanged at 0.0% in all periods.
• Macroeconomic shock 2: an unexpected fall in the rate of money growth from 2.5% to 0%
per period at period 0. Thus, Mt = 0.025(t + 1) for t   1 and Mt = 0 for t   0. The
inflation target ⇡T is lowered from 2.5% to 0.0% at period 0.
• Macroeconomic shock 3: an announced disinflation at period t =  8 of the same magnitude
as (2). While the announcement of the forthcoming change inflation target ⇡T occurs at
period t =  8, it is only lowered from 2.5% to 0.0% at period t = 0.
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As the intention here is to study the extent to which the business cycle behaves differently in
response to the same shock, the same parameter10 values in Mankiw and Reis (2002) are used
but different solutions for the dynamic paths are solved under the -augmented Phillips Curves.
This is where the paper takes another different direction: instead of having a single parameter  
(or  , for the sticky-information case) to pin down the these solutions, there is now an additional
parameter, , that concurrently specifies the deviation from some benchmark in the ideal world
where information and opportunity to change prices arrive with full certainty at each period.
Then, by adjusting the values of  in relation to   and vice versa on an incremental basis, this
section introduces a framework that models a behaviour of inflation and output precisely for
each degree of bias. To achieve this, the dynamics of inflation and output when  is 1 and
when  deviates from1 will be first illustrated, followed by the results when  is zero and when
 increases from zero. By motivating this study from both extremes, the hope is that one can
learn more about the limits of this behavioural model.
3.1 Solving for a dynamic path under the κ-augmented sticky-price Phillips
Curve
In order to construct a dynamic path for prices under the modified sticky-price and sticky-
information Phillips Curve, I use the exact same specifications in Mankiw and Reis’s original
paper for a model of aggregate demand given by:
Mt = Pt + Yt (14)
This model of aggregate demand can be combined with the -augmented sticky-price model in
(4) to yield the following expectational difference equation:
Et(Pt+1) +
✓
  
2
(1   )
  (1 +   +
 
µ
)
◆
Pt +
 
µ
Pt−1 =   Mt (15)
with parameters µ,   and   defined as:
µ =
↵ 2
1   (1   )
(16)
  =
↵ 2
1   
(17)
  =
 (1   )+1(1 + ⇡T )+2
   ⇡T (1   )
(18)
10According to the benchmark models, ↵ = 0.1,   =   = 0.25, ⇢ = 0.5. The residual for monetary policy shocks
is chosen to have a standard deviation of 0.007 based on historical estimates of monetary aggregates M1 and M2
between 1960 and 1999. Refer to Mankiw and Reis (2002) pages 1302 and 1308 for a more thorough discussion.
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A dynamic path for prices given by the model of the sticky-price new Keynesian Phillips Curve
can thus be obtained by solving for the expectational difference equation in (15) such that:
Pt = ✓Pt−1 + (
↵ 2
1   (1   )
)✓
∞X
i=0
 
(
1   
1   (1   )
)✓
 i
Et(Mt+i) (19)
This equation itself pins down the dynamic path for all prices and subsequently inflation. The
path of output can then be obtained from equation (14) easily. A full proof is deferred to the
appendix. Observe that as  ! 1, price setters approach a world without bias: they have full
rational expectations.   subsequently approaches 0, allowing us to obtain the impulse response
of the benchmark model given by:
Pt = ✓Pt−1 + (1  ✓)
2
∞X
i=0
(✓)iEt(Mt+i) (20)
At this juncture, notice that equations (19) and (20) each produces a different dynamic path
of prices (and, of output) that differ for two reasons. First, observe that the impulse response
of prices under the model with bounded rationality looks exactly like the impulse response of
the benchmark model, except that each of the terms in the summation operator are multiplied
by some scaling factor 6= 1. Second, the key parameter that determines the dynamic path is ✓,
and its value differs for both equations. In the model under bounded rationality, ✓ is chosen as
the smaller of the two positive roots from the coefficient of LP ∗t (L and F are lag and forward
operators respectively) following expectational difference equation: 
F 2 +
✓
  
2
1   
  (1 +   +
 
µ
)
◆
F +
 
µ
!
LP ∗t =   M
∗
t (21)
rather than the expectational difference equation in the benchmark case as given by:
✓
F 2   (2 +  )F + 1
!
LP ∗t =   M
∗
t (22)
Subsequently, ✓ in the modified model is obtained without a loss of generality as the smaller of
the following two positive roots:
✓ =
  κ 
2
1−  + (1 +   +
 
µ
)±
s✓
 κ 2
1−    (1 +   +
 
µ
)
◆2
  4 
µ
2
(23)
While ✓ determines the dynamic paths of prices and output, the deviation from its benchmark
value now rests on the value of  . Only when   = 0, one retrieves the original value of ✓ given
by the benchmark model. In turn, this occurs when  =1, or when price setters have unlimited
foresight and can formulate rational forecasts over an infinite time horizon. Expectedly, the
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dynamic properties of the model are now determined by the values of both   and , such that
✓ is only defined when: ✓
   
2
1   
  (1 +   +
 
µ
)
◆2
 
4 
µ
  0 (24)
With some tedious algebra, which I once again leave to the appendix, the above inequality can
be equivalently expressed as an inequality held between two functions f(.) and g(.) where
f(, )   g(, ) (25)
such that
f(, ) = (  +
↵ 
1   
)2 =
✓
 (1   )+1(1 + ⇡T )+2
   ⇡T (1   )
+
↵ 
1   
◆2
(26)
g(, ) =
4
1   
(    ↵) =
4
1   
✓
 (1   )+1(1 + ⇡T )+2
   ⇡T (1   )
  ↵
◆
(27)
This relation subsequently imposes a restriction on the possible values that  and   can simul-
taneously take in the sticky-price model. As the paper would illustrate in section 3.4 below, this
restriction limits the realism of the sticky-price model in the context of bounded rationality, as
there are only a certain range of   that defines , which subsequently implies that there is only
a restricted range of real solutions for the path of prices.
3.2 Solving for a dynamic path under the κ-augmented sticky-information
Phillips Curve
Similar to the sticky-price model, the sticky-information model also imposes constraints on
parameter values of . However, this constraint is no longer between   and  but instead
between t and . This is due to prices being set by two different groups of price setters in the
model:
Pt =  
tX
j=0
(1   )jEt−j [(1  ↵)Pt + ↵Mt] +  
∞X
j=t+1
(1   )jEt−j [(1  ↵)Pt + ↵Mt] (28)
Price setters who are aware of the demand shock that occurs at t = 0 strictly form expectatons of
the new path of prices ex-post beginning from t = 0, while those who are not aware of the demand
shock have ex-ante expectations that are formed strictly before t = 0. It is straightforward to
see that the upper bound of 1 the second term is changed to  under bounded rationality and
the above is written with a heuristic as follows:
Pt =  
tX
j=0
(1   )jEt−j [(1  ↵)Pt + ↵Mt]
+  
X
j=t+1
(1   )jEt−j [(1  ↵)Pt + ↵Mt] +  
∞X
j=+1
'jPt−j (29)
17
where ' = (1    )(1 + ⇡T ). Notice that price setters who hold ex-ante expectations are now
constrained by their bounded rationality and no longer have past expectations that are formed
since the beginning time. This imposes a restriction t     1. Notice further that  does
not feature in the first summation operator. This implicitly assumes that the constraint t 
   1 being satisfied, such that price setters who form ex-ante expectations do so within their
cognitive bounds. What happens if t > ? The above equation must then be written in the
following manner instead:
Pt =  
X
j=0
(1   )jEt−j [(1  ↵)Pt ++↵Mt] +  
∞X
j=+1
'jPt−j (30)
Observe that all expectation terms are ex-post to the shock at t = 0, with the furthest possible
expectation formed in the past given by Et−Pt. These are all expectations formed by price
setters who are aware of the new path of aggregate demand. Price setters who had ex-ante
expectations can no longer form expectations as the time period t is now too far away from
t = 0. As a result, they set prices based on the heuristic expressed by the second term. Leaving
the full derivations to the appendix, the impulses responses are thus summarized by the following:
Pt =
8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
−log(0.9)
✓
(1− )t+1−(1− )κ+1
◆
+ 
∞X
j=+1
'jPt−j
1−(1−↵)
✓
1−(1− )t+1
◆ for t    1
⇣Pt−−1 + 'Pt−1 if t > 
where ⇣ =  
!
'+1 and ! = 1  (1 ↵)[1  (1   )+1] are constants for a given . This provides
the path for prices under policy experiment 1. Notice that for t > , prices today are some
weighted average of yesterday’s prices and prices    1 periods ago. A large  subsequently
gives less Iight to past prices (as an anchor)    1 periods ago. This is consistent with price
setters approaching the perfect benchmark, resulting in past prices becoming more redundant
in serving its role as an anchor. The dynamic paths of prices for experiment 2 and 3 are solved
in a similar manner in subsection 4.5 of the appendix.
3.3 Theoretical results in the presence of macroeconomic shocks when κ de-
viates from 1
Having solved for the dynamic path of prices for both the -augmented sticky-price and sticky-
information model, the paper now turns to illustrating the business cycle in response to macroe-
conomic shocks and how it evolves throughout the the entire spectrum as  is allowed to deviate
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from 1. Three interesting results immediately emerge when these impulse responses are com-
pared to the benchmark11:
Result 1: When price setters are only capable of forming rational expectations ahead for a
limited planning horizon, inflation demonstrates a larger degree of persistence and takes longer
to return to equilibrium after an exogenous shock. Throughout this paper, inflation persistence
will be defined as the impulse response having a gentler gradient on its path of return12. Here,
inflation persistence is endogenous to the price adjustment rule rather than the Phillips curve13.
This is hardly a surprising result, especially given that the backward-looking nature of price
adjustment is now provided by the heuristic bias. Note, however, that a deviation from full
rational benchmark here is still unable to generate a hump-shaped response of inflation under
the sticky-price model. This is also unsurprising. Consistent with Woodford (2003), this is due
to agents being able to acquire full forward-looking behaviour for as long a horizon as they can
even under the proposed rule of price adjustment motivated by this paper.
Result 2: The path of inflation is no longer smooth under the sticky-information model. Rather,
in the presence of pricing bias, inflation may jump discontinuously after some periods of the
shock before oscillating back to equilibrium.
Result 3: Under the case when   10, announced disinflation is equally capable of causing a
boom, contradicting the results given by Mankiw and Reis (2002) and how central banks conduct
monetary policy in reality. All impulse responses of inflation and output are given as follows:
11That is, when  = ∞.
12This definition makes it easy to identify persistence just from a simple inspection of the impulse responses
themselves.
13Fuhrer and Moore (1995) models inflation persistence with ⇡t =
1
2
⇡t−1 +
1
2
Et⇡t+1 + cYt where the backward-
lookingness is modelled explicitly.
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3.3.1 Macroeconomic shock #1 when  deviates from 1: an unexpected fall in
aggregate demand
Inflation under sticky-prices Inflation under sticky-information
Output under sticky-prices Output under sticky-information
3.3.2 Macroeconomic shock #2 when  deviates from 1: an unexpected fall in
the rate of money growth from 2.5% to 0% per period at period 0
Inflation under sticky-prices Inflation under sticky-information
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Output under sticky-prices Output under sticky-information
3.3.3 Macroeconomic shock #3 when  deviates from1: an announced disinflation
at period t =  8 of the same magnitude as (2)
Inflation under sticky-prices Inflation under sticky-information
Output under sticky-prices Output under sticky-information
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3.4 Theoretical results in the presence of macroeconomic shocks when κ de-
viates from 0
Having illustrated the behaviour of inflation and output when  was initially infinity and when 
deviates from this full-rational expectations benchmark, this paper now takes a position to study
their behaviour from the other end of the spectrum: that is, when  is first 0 and when  starts
deviating from zero. At this end of the extreme,  = 0 corresponds to the hypothetical case
when price setters cannot form rational expectations at all, and becomes thoroughly backward-
looking conditioned on the inflation target. Yet, as this paper will show, both models of inflation
expectations augmented with  does not yield entirely oscillatory dynamics14 as one would expect
from the purely backward-looking model. What is unique about  approaching the limit of 0 is
that the impulse responses under both sticky-prices and sticky-information have to be modified
further.
Under the -augmented sticky-price model,  = 0 imposes strict bounds on the values of  . This
in turn determines the value of ✓ that pins down the dynamic path of prices. This is a result of
having to satisfy the following set constraints first introduced in secion 3.1:
f(, )   g(, ) (31)
✓µ
 
< 1 (32)
such that
f(, ) = (  +
↵ 
1   
)2 =
✓
 (1   )+1(1 + ⇡T )+2
   ⇡T (1   )
+
↵ 
1   
◆2
(33)
g(, ) =
4
1   
(    ↵) =
4
1   
✓
 (1   )+1(1 + ⇡T )+2
   ⇡T (1   )
  ↵
◆
(34)
While both equations (31) and (32) pin down the dynamic properties of the -augmented sticky-
price model, they also introduce a theoretical challenge to the model by limiting the values that
both  and   can simultaneously take. As the value of  decreases from 1 and approaches 0,
the range of values that   can take narrows to [0.88, 0.99]. The sticky-price model then implies
that a dynamic path of prices will now only exist for a very high frequency of price change,
which could well be inconsistent with empirical data. Table 1 below illustrates the relationship
between ,   and the subsequent solution for ✓. It thus becomes apparent that it is no longer as
straightforward to compare the impulse responses for  = 0 and for small deviations away from
this lower bound, as a chosen value of   /2 [0.88, 0.99] for deviations of  above 0 will not yield
a solution for the path of prices. In order to subsequently provide a meaningful benchmark for
14Mankiw and Reis (2002) also illustrates the impulse responses of a model of adaptive expectations in the form
of ⇡t = (
α
2
λ
1−λ
)Yt + ⇡t−1 to the shocks elaborated in this paper.
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Table 1: range of possible   narrows as  approaches 0
   ✓
8 [0.23, 0.99] [0.9911, 0.0854]
6 [0.28, 0.99] [1.0009, 0.0854]
4 [0.37, 0.99] [0.9973, 0.0854]
2 [0.53, 0.99] [1.0256, 0.0854]
0 [0.88, 0.99] [1.2663, 0.1710]
the dynamics of inflation and output as  deviates slightly from 0, this paper will first provide a
complete characterisation of these dynamics as   goes from one end of the spectrum to another.
The purpose of this is to allow for an inference of behaviour beyond an arbitrarily chosen value
of   used for subsequent analyses as  deviates from 0. Interestingly, these results reveal three
highly contrasting paths of inflation when  is kept at 0, but   is allowed to vary slightly from
the lower bound of 0.88.
Path 1: At the extreme lower bound with  = 0, inflation and output exhibits explosive dynamics
and essentially becomes a bubble. Recall that the dynamic path of prices under the sticky-price
model is pinned down by the following equation:
Pt = ✓Pt−1 + (
↵ 2
1   (1   )
)✓
∞X
i=0
 
(
1   
1   (1   )
)✓
 i
Et(Mt+i) (35)
where a real solution for ✓ is obtained from solving the quadratic from the following expectational
difference equation:  
F 2 +
✓
  
2
1   
  (1 +   +
 
µ
)
◆
F +
 
µ
!
LP ∗t =   M
∗
t (36)
When  is uniquely 0 and   is 0.88, the equations above yield a real solution for ✓ being larger
than 1. From equation (35), this results in prices today becoming ever higher than yesterday’s
and thus inflation ends up becoming a bubble.
Path 2: Raising   slightly to 0.90 with  = 0 results in a static path of inflation. This is a
result of ✓ being exactly 1. As a result of prices not changing after the intial shock, inflation
initially falls and returns to zero immediately at period t = 0.
Path 3: The paths of inflation retrieve their benchmark characteristics as   increases even
higher. This is a result of ✓ < 1. The impulse responses of both inflation and output are
summarized by figures (13) - (18) below:
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3.4.1 Macroeconomic shock #1 when  is 0: an unexpected fall in aggregate de-
mand
Inflation under sticky-prices Output under sticky-prices
3.4.2 Macroeconomic shock #2 when  is 0: an unexpected fall in the rate of
money growth from 2.5% to 0% per period at period 0
Inflation under sticky-prices Output under sticky-prices
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3.4.3 Macroeconomic shock #3 when  is 0: an announced disinflation at period
t =  8 of the same magnitude as (2)
Inflation under sticky-prices Output under sticky-prices
The impulse responses under sticky-information differs from those under sticky-prices in that no
parameter values are restricted in any way by the value of . However, the impulse responses
become completely different when  = 0. Overall prices under sticky-information are instead
pinned down by the following equation15:
Pt =  [(1  ↵)Pt + ↵Mt] +  
∞X
j=1
'jPt−j (37)
Observe that prices are now independent from expectations. This holds true by definition and
is implied by having  = 0. The dynamic path of prices under all three macroeconomic shocks
is then given by:
Pt =
↵ 
1   (1  ↵)
Mt +
 
1   (1  ↵)
∞X
j=1
'jPt−j (38)
Rejecting the equilibrium where inflation is either a bubble or follows some static path, the
following impulse responses study the behaviour of inflation and output when  is allowed to
deviate marginally from the extreme end of 0. The parameter values of   and   are set to be
0.54. Two particular conclusions stand out:
Conclusion 1: In the presence of recessions, inflation tends to be more resilient but also takes
much longer to return to equilibrium after the shock. Combined with result 1, this implies that
as  varies from 1 to 0, the response of inflation varies from being most sensitive to being the
15Equation (37) is obtained from setting t = 0 in the equation Pt =  
tX
j=0
(1−  )jEt−j [(1 − ↵)Pt + ↵Mt] +
 
∞X
j=t+1
(1−  )jEt−j [(1− ↵)Pt + ↵Mt].
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least sensitive. The persistence of inflation, however, increases correspondingly.16
Conclusion 2: Towards the extreme near  = 0, the characteristic humped-shaped response
of inflation under the sticky-information model disappears and instead starts to resemble that
under sticky-prices. This is not too surprising a result, as the hallmark of the sticky-information
lies in how the timing of inflation expectations differs from that under sticky-prices. When 
approaches 0, this difference becomes negligible.
3.4.4 Macroeconomic shock #1 when  deviates from 0: an unexpected fall in
aggregate demand: Here,   =   = 0.54
Inflation under sticky-prices Inflation under sticky-information
Output under sticky-prices Output under sticky-information
16Observe in this simulation that both inflation and output returns to equilibrium relatively faster than the
previous string of simulations where  decreases from ∞. This a result of increasing the value of   and   to 0.54
from 0.25.
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3.4.5 Macroeconomic shock #2 when  deviates from 0: an unexpected fall in
the rate of money growth from 2.5% to 0% per period at period 0: Here,
  =   = 0.54
Inflation under sticky-prices Inflation under sticky-information
Output under sticky-prices Output under sticky-information
3.4.6 Macroeconomic shock #3 when  deviates from 0: an announced disinflation
at period t =  8 of the same magnitude as (2): Here,   =   = 0.54
Inflation under sticky-prices Inflation under sticky-information
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Output under sticky-prices Output under sticky-information
3.5 The role of Central Bank’s inflation target in dynamic price adjustment
in the presence of monetary policy shocks
Up to this juncture, the focus of this paper has been on  and how it affects the dynamics of
both inflation and output, in terms of both duration and nature of their response to shocks.
While much could already be learned about the role of  from the impulse responses, one might
say less with regards to the role of the inflation target in the rule of price adjustment. This is
not surprising, as it was set to be 0% in all 3 shocks. Only by exploring the behaviour of impulse
responses in the presence of shocks in monetary policy may one be able to motivate the role of
the inflation target further. This is because there are now no equations that set the inflation
target to 0.0% on an a priori basis. Hence, we allow for an additional degree of freedom for the
inflation target to take whatever value it has to achieve the goal of policy stabilisation. Unlike
the previous sections, the inflation target is no longer zero.
In order to illustrate this, I explore the behaviour of inflation and output given a one standard
deviation shock in monetary policy as outlined by Mankiw and Reis (2002). While this paper
follows the same set-up in order to eventually compare the results with a benchmark, its contri-
bution lies in solving for a different expression of the impulse response, especially since the both
models of the Phillips Curve now differ from those of the benchmark and are now functions of
the inflation target. The solutions for the impulse responses will then differ according to the
extent of bias. I begin by writing the growth of money supply Mt as an AR(1) process as follows:
∆Mt = ⇢∆Mt−1 + ✏t (39)
where ✏t is a white-noise innovation. Under this model, the level of money supply is non-
stationary but the growth rate of money supply is stationary for all |⇢| < 1. This essentially
requires the absence of an unit root. Given this conjecture, inflation must then follow a stationary
process as well. The AR(1) process for inflation and prices can equivalently be written as a
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MA(1) process as follows:
⇡t =
∞X
j=0
⇢j✏t−j (40)
Pt =
∞X
⌧=0
∞X
j=0
 j✏t−j−⌧ (41)
In order to solve for the impulse responses {  } of inflation given by the sticky-price model, I
substitute the above MA(1) processes into the dynamic path for prices given by equation (19)
solved in section 3.1. This yields the following stochastic equation for inflation ⇡t:
∞X
⌧=0
∞X
j=0
 j✏t−j−⌧ = ✓
∞X
⌧=0
∞X
j=0
 j✏t−1−j−⌧ + µ✓
∞X
i=0
 
(
µ
 
)✓
 i ∞X
j=0
∞X
⌧=max{i−j,0}
⇢j✏t+i−j−⌧ (42)
as Et{✏t+i−j−⌧} = ✏t+i−j−⌧ for all i j  ⌧ and is zero otherwise. Subsequently,  j are coefficients
to be determined. Matching all coefficients of ✏t−  in this stochastic equation subsequently yields
the solution for {  } such that:
   = (✓   1)
 −1X
j=0
 j + (
µ✓
1  ⇢
)
✓
1
1  µ
 
✓
 
⇢ +1
1  µ
 
✓⇢
◆
(43)
For the sticky-information model, I redefine the AR(1) processes of prices and money such that:
Mt =
∞X
%=0
∞X
i=0
⇢i✏t−i−% (44)
∆Mt =
∞X
i=0
⇢i✏t−i (45)
Pt =
∞X
%=0
∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−i−% (46)
⇡t =
∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−i (47)
Substituting the these processes into the -augmented sticky-information Phillips Curve outlined
in section 2.2 by equation (11), and matching all coefficients of ✏t−  in a similar manner, the
full characterization of the stochastic process for inflation {Ψ } is given by
Ψ  =
↵ 

(1 
 −1X
i=0
Ψi) +
 X
i=1
⇢i + ⇢ 
 X
i=1
(1   )i
 
1   (1  ↵)
 X
i=0
(1   )i
for     (48)
Ψ  =
↵ 

(1 
 −1X
i=0
Ψi) +
 X
i=1
⇢i
 
+Π
1   (1  ↵)
for     + 1 (49)
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where Π =  
 −−1X
i=0
' −i+1Ψi+(1+⇡
T ) 2
 X
j=+1
✓  −jX
i=0
Ψi
◆
and noting the discontinuity at   = .
For   =   = 0.25, the impulse responses for both models of inflation are given as follows:
Inflation under sticky-prices inflation under sticky-information
Output under sticky-prices Output under sticky-information
It turns out that this is the set of impulse responses that corresponds to the inflation target ⇡T
being lowered to  25%17 as a result of the contraction in monetary policy18. What happens
if the inflation target remains unchanged at 0%? As seen in the alternative set of impulse
responses below, output does not return to equilibrium. This is as if there could be monetary
non-neutrality even in the long run. This, however, is a violation of Friedman (1968): there
cannot be a permanent trade-off between inflation and output! This monetary policy simulation
thus reveals two crucial insights behind this paper:
Result 1: While inflation returns to equilibrium, output does so only if the inflation target is
lowered to match the contraction in monetary policy. In fact, the inflation target is now an
explicit policy instrument.
17There is no closed form solution for this.
18If it were to be an expansion in monetary policy, ⇡T would be set to be higher at 25% rather than 0.0%.
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Intuitively, because all agents in this economy are assumed to be adjusting prices using the
inflation target as a heuristic anchor at the limits of their forecast horizon, policy can only
be effective if the central bank changes the target in the right direction to guide the price
adjustment in that direction as well. In fact, it has a flavour of the Taylor principle in the sense
that when the frequency of price adjustment is low, the lowering of the inflation target needs to
be aggressive for policy to be effective and vice versa19. This result potentially builds on two
other papers that has been written regarding the conduct of monetary policy. First, Blanchard
et. al (2010) proposed raising the inflation target to 4% from 2% in order to avoid the zero
lower bound. This suggests that rather than assuming an arbitrary choice of the numerical
target for inflation, this choice should be properly discerned and debated. Whilst to a different
purpose, this paper equally shows that the specific choice of this numerical target is important to
output stabilization, at least under the proposed rule of price adjustment. Second, Reis (2017)
examined two episodes where the Fed and the Bank of England gone long in the 20th century,
and found that targeting the long-term interest rate as a policy instrument for the most part
fail to anchor inflation. Yet, what the above result suggests is for the central bank to stabilise
output by going long - in the sense of targeting the long term interest rate indirectly through
attaining some target long term inflation rate - by using the inflation target as if it were to be
a short-term policy instrument. While a thorough discussion of policy implications is beyond
the scope of this paper, it recognizes that the implied consequences might fail in practicality -
especially since changing the inflation target as an active instrument may bring back the old
time inconsistency problem and put this paper in the cross hairs of the usual ‘rules vs discretion’
debate.
Inflation under sticky-prices Output under sticky-prices
19Refer to sheet 6 of replication file for -augmented sticky-information as an example. There,  = 10 and  
varies between 0.25 and 0.45. But when   is 0.45, ⇡T needs only to be lowered to -10%, as compared to -25% for
the case when   is 0.25.
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Inflation under sticky-information Output under sticky-information
Result 2: Under the sticky-price model, both the duration and shape of response for inflation
and output are the same regardless of the value of .
This implies that whether price setters are capable of forming rational expectations over longer
horizons no longer matters when the inflation target is used to anchor expectations. Intuitively,
the path of prices converge for all  because everyone has the same nominal anchor ; they rely
only on the target, rather than making forecasts over the long horizon. Mathematically, the
dynamic path of the -augmented model converges20 to that of the canonical model for this
inflation target. Under the sticky-information model where information arrives slowly, there is
still a role for  as not all price-setters pay attention to the policy outlook.
4 The dynamic behaviour of inflation and output as
we vary parameter values of λ and γ
Having learned much about the role of  and the inflation target, studying the roles of   (or  )
remains the only endeavour that is left of this paper in order to develop the proposed theory
of price adjustment under bias fully. In the original Calvo model,   was the parameter that
specified the deviation from an economy with fully flexible prices. The higher   is, the more
price setters are able to respond to shocks by re-adjusting prices and one can expect minimal
disturbance to output. For the sticky-information model, a higher   represents that a larger
population of price setters are able to gather information, and with this, subsequently acquire
rational expectations about some future path of Mt and eventually converge to some Calvo
benchmark. Without even illustrating with impulse responses, one can immediately draw a
20Check that  κ decreases to 0 when ⇡
T=-0.25. Then, equation (19) reduces to (20).
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relationship between these parameters and the behaviour of the business cycle. Yet, what is
less clear about   and   are the ways in which they may alter certain results that this paper
has established thus far with respect to . Acknowledging these observations about the short
term fluctuations studied throughout this paper, I focus instead on thinking about them as a
set questions:
Question 1: If lowering  is suggestive of larger inflation persistence, can increasing   or  
decrease this persistence?
Question 2: if lowering  is suggestive of discontinuous jumps and oscillatory paths of inflation,
can increasing   result some convergence towards a smooth path as one would expect from the
benchmark?
Question 3: If empirical estimates of the dynamic response of real activity to shocks show a
gradual ‘hump-shaped’ response (Mankiw and Reis, 2006), can increasing   or   reduce this
response in both size and duration that have been augmented by ?
As one might expect, the answers to these questions are: yes, yes and yes. If  is about deviating
the model from some full rational expectations benchmark, then   and   returns the model to
this benchmark despite the fact that the solutions for the impulse responses are still functions of
. But this is hardly an intellectual victory; in the Calvo economy there is little need to demand
for rational expectations if prices are fully flexible, while in the Mankiw-Reis economy the core
assumption rests on price setters acquiring full rational expectations as long as they gather
information. Under sticky-prices, results show that increasing   mainly affects the convexity
and the height of the impulse responses. When price setters are able to change prices more often,
there is no need for them to form expectations over a longer time horizon, and so one may be
tempted to conclude that the role of expectations and hence, behavioural models, are diminished
in an economy where price adjustment is more frequent. Similarly, the role of expectations is
reduced in the Mankiw-Reis world when information arrives quickly. Remarkably, the impulse
responses now resemble those illustrated previously under the case when  deviates from 1
despite the fact that the equation that pins down these responses are all different! This provides
a strong case to argue that that the time horizon  does not matter when information arrives
quickly. In the following set of impulse responses,  is set to 10 while   (and  ) is allowed to
increase:
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4.0.1 Macroeconomic shock #1 when   and   deviates from 0.25: an unexpected
fall in aggregate demand: Here,  = 10
Inflation under sticky-prices Inflation under sticky-information
Output under sticky-prices Output under sticky-information
4.0.2 Macroeconomic shock #2 when   and   deviates from 0.25: an unexpected
fall in the rate of money growth from 2.5% to 0% per period at period 0:
Here,  = 10
Inflation under sticky-prices Inflation under sticky-information
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Output under sticky-prices Output under sticky-information
4.0.3 Macroeconomic shock #3 when   and   deviates from 0.25: an announced
disinflation at period t =  8 of the same magnitude as (2): Here,  = 10
Inflation under sticky-prices Inflation under sticky-information
Output under sticky-prices Output under sticky-information
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5 Conclusion and future work
In days since the 2008 financial crisis, macroeconomics has been criticized by many for drawing
inference based on ‘overly simplified’ models that rest overwhelmingly on the assumption of
rational expectations. This is not quite the case, however, when one examines the amount of
active literature prior to the crisis which sought to relax this overly demanding assumption.
Perhaps what policymakers need is a behavioural model that is robust enough to accommodate
the inconsistencies of human behaviour, and yet still yield results that can be solved using
conventional technologies21 that can be used in a conventional policy setting.
Recognising this priority, this paper extents on the work by Mankiw and Reis (2002) and exam-
ines a rule of price adjustment where price setters have realistic time horizons over which they
can form rational expectations, and, in light of the recent attention both given to, and drawn by
central banks through their conduct of forward guidance and inflation targeting, assumes that
price setters can equally make use of some past, observable prices and the inflation target as a
nominal anchor when their planning horizons are so far ahead that they can no longer justify
a well-reasoned expectation of their own. In essence, this is a form of bounded rationality a
step further from the theory of sticky-information, which, in turn, is a step away from the new
Keynesian, full rational expectations Calvo benchmark. The analysis in this paper shows that
it is possible to re-model the Phillips Curve, and present a framework that can illustrate the
behaviour of short-run business cycles throughout the entire spectrum of rationality. Subse-
quently, this paper presented several learning points from applying the framework to study the
impulse responses of inflation and output to shocks of various natures. Firstly, how price setters
form inflation expectations and whether these expectations are accurate or heterogeneous do not
matter when they are able to gather information or change prices more frequently. Secondly,
because it is often difficult to figure out the true implications of monetary policy - whether it
is due to data uncertainty through lags or the numerous forms of technocratic language that
one would expect from central bank communication - policymakers might expect private agents
to similarly adopt a nominal anchor for their own expectations, and, as this paper shows, the
choice of even this numerical value for such an anchor - such as the inflation target - could prove
to be pivotal to output stabilization. Lastly, larger extents of bounded rationality increases the
persistence of inflation, and, under sticky-information, even allows for discontinuous jumps and
oscillatory dynamics of inflation and real output.
With this, can one better understand the fluctuations of the business cycle through the lens of
21Such as the method of undetermined coefficients, or minimizing some loss function of the central bank.
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bounded rationality? Can behavioural economics inform monetary policy in anyway? This paper
believes it can. This opens the door for future work to solve for a general equilibrium with some
utility-maximizing, monopolistic price setter, where his behavioural heuristic may be modeled in
a continuous, rather than a discrete process. Central banks could further be concerned with the
endogeneity of : that is, whether their increased actions - both in communication and in the
variety of instruments - aid or hinder the formation of expectations. This is pertinent to the work
on behavioural models especially since the jury is still out on whether forward guidance is about
making predictions of the state of the economy or about the policy instrument itself22 (Reis,
2018). As this paper has shown, a varying  ultimately leads to varying degrees of persistence,
duration and size of response for both inflation and output. What is the optimal policy response
to each case is subject to calibration, and likely will be the form of future research in this area.
To this end, incorporating stylized results of behavioural economics into models of how people
understand and act on monetary policy will likely pave the way for macroeconomics to progress
even further.23
22Suppose the central bank sets policy according to it = f(st) + ✏t, where ✏t is the term that captures policy
surprises, st is the conjectured state of the economy and f(.) is the policy instrument. Then, is forward guidance
about explaining what f(.) is, or is it about communicating predictions for st?
23This concludes. According to ShareLateX, total word count excluding the appendix is 9952.
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6 Appendix: Proofs of solutions presented in the text
6.1 Derivation of the κ-augmented sticky-price new Keynesian Phillips Curve
To derive the modified sticky-price Phillips Curve, start with the following rule of price adjust-
mented motivated in section II:
Xt =  
X
j=0
(1   )jEt(P
∗
t+j) +  
∞X
j=+1
(1   )jPt−1(1 + ⇡
T )j+1 (50)
Taking out the first term and redefining the summation operator, equation (50) can be written
as:
Xt =  P
∗
t + (1   ) 
X
j=0
(1   )jEt(P
∗
t+j+1) +  
∞X
j=+1
(1   )jPt−1(1 + ⇡
T )j+1 (51)
Equivalently, equation (50) can be analogously defined as:
Xt+1 =  
kX
j=0
(1   )jEt+1(P
∗
t+j+1) +  
∞X
j=+1
(1   )jPt(1 + ⇡
T )j+1 (52)
Breaking the sum and using the law of iterated expectations, I can substitute equation (52) into
(51) to obtain:
Xt =  P
∗
t + (1   )Et(Xt+1)
 
✓
(1   ) 
∞X
j=+1
(1   )jPt(1 + ⇡
T )j+1    
∞X
j=+1
(1   )jPt−1(1 + ⇡
T )j+1
◆
(53)
Which can further be simplified into:
Xt =  P
∗
t + (1   )Et(Xt+1) 
✓
 
∞X
j=+1
(1   )j⇡t(1 + ⇡
T )j+1
◆
+  2
∞X
j=+1
(1   )jPt(1 + ⇡
T )j+1 (54)
The general price levels in the economy is then obtained using a weighted average of prices set
by firms in the past and the reset prices of firms that had the opportunity to adjust:
Pt =  Xt + (1   )Pt−1 (55)
Rearranging equation (55), I can derive an expression for inflation ⇡t as follows:
Xt =
⇡t
 
+ Pt−1 (56)
38
Substituting for Xt in equation (54) using equation (56), I obtain the desired model of the
modified Phillips Curve as follows:
⇡t =
↵ 2
1   
Yt + Et(⇡t+1)  (
 
1   
)(⇡t) 
∞X
j=+1
(1   )j(1 + ⇡T )j+1
+ (
 2
1   
)(Pt) 
∞X
j=+1
(1   )j(1 + ⇡T )j+1 (57)
I can subsequently define   to be:
  =  
∞X
j=+1
(1   )j(1 + ⇡T )j+1 =
 (1   )+1(1 + ⇡T )+2
   ⇡T (1   )
(58)
Substituting equation (58) into (57) and rearranging, I obtain the desired equation for the new
Keynesian Phillips Curve with bounded rationality as seen in the text::
⇡t =
↵ 2
1   (1   )
Yt +
1   
1   (1   )
Et(⇡t+1) +
  
2
1   (1   )
Pt (59)
6.2 Derivation of the κ-augmented sticky-information Phillips Curve
Under the constraints imposed by bounded rationality, overall prices in the economy are given
by:
Pt =  
X
j=0
(1   )jEt−j(P
∗
t ) +  
∞X
j=+1
(1   )jPt−j(1 + ⇡
T )j (60)
Taking out the first term and redefining the summation operator, I obtain:
Pt =  P
∗
t + (1   ) 
X
j=0
(1   )jEt−j−1(P
∗
t ) +  
∞X
j=+1
(1   )jPt−j(1 + ⇡
T )j (61)
Equation (60) can be analogously defined as:
Pt−1 =  
X
j=0
(1   )jEt−j−1(P
∗
t−1) +  
∞X
j=+1
(1   )jPt−j−1(1 + ⇡
T )j (62)
An expression for inflation ⇡t can thus be obtained by subtracting equation (62) from equation
(61) as follows:
⇡t =  (Pt + ↵Yt) +  
X
j=0
(1   )jEt−j−1(⇡t + ↵∆Yt)
+  
∞X
j=+1
(1   )j⇡t−j(1 + ⇡
T )j    2
X
j=0
(1   )jEt−j−1(P
∗
t ) (63)
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Dividing equation (63) throughout by (1   ), I can obtain:
   
✓
(Pt   (
 ↵
1   
)Yt
◆
=   2
X
j=0
(1   )jEt−j−1(P
∗
t )
 
 2
1   
∞X
j=+1
(1   )jPt−j(1 + ⇡
T )j (64)
The last term in equation (63) can therefore be substituted out using equation (64) and the
desired expression for the sticky-price Phillips Curve under bounded rationality can be obtained
as follows:
⇡t = (
↵ 
1   
)Yt +  
X
j=0
(1   )jEt−j−1(⇡t + ↵∆Yt)
+  
∞X
j=+1
(1   )j(1 + ⇡T )j
✓
⇡t−j + (
 
1   
)Pt−j
◆
(65)
6.3 Derivation of the expression for a dynamic path under the κ-augmented
sticky-price new Keynesian Phillips Curve
Following Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Sargent (1987), an impulse response for prices can be
obtained for the modified sticky-price new Keynesian Phillips Curve. Recall that the modified
Phillips Curve is given by:
⇡t =
↵ 2
1   (1   )
Yt +
1   
1   (1   )
Et(⇡t+1) +
  
2
1   (1   )
Pt (66)
I introduce new parameters µ and   such that:
µ =
↵ 2
1   (1   )
(67)
  =
↵ 2
1   
(68)
Plugging in equation (67) and (68) into (66), inflation ⇡t can be expressed as:
⇡t = µYt +
µ
 
Et⇡t+1 +
µ 
↵
Pt (69)
Note in particular that as   = 0, which occurs when  ! 1 as shown previously in section
II, µ =   and equation (69) reduces to the benchmark model of the sticky-price new Keynesian
Phillips Curve:
⇡t =
↵ 2
1   
Yt + Et(⇡t+1) (70)
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I can rewrite the Phillips Curve expressed by equation (66) using the aggregate demand equation
as follows:
(1   )µ
↵ 2
Et(Pt+1) +
✓
µ  
2   (1   )µ  µ↵ 2   ↵ 2
↵ 2
◆
Pt + Pt−1 =  µMt (71)
Multiplying both sides of the equation by ↵ 
2
(1− )µ , equation (71) can be simplified into:
Et(Pt+1) +
✓
  
2
(1   )
  (1 +   +
 
µ
)
◆
Pt +
 
µ
Pt−1 =   Mt (72)
This produces an expectational difference equation similar in structure to that found in Mankiw
and Reis’s (2002) original paper. Subsequently, I take expectations at time t and express these
expectational variables with an asterisk. Using both the forward and lag operator F and L
respectively, equation (72) can be re-expressed in the following manner: 
F 2 +
✓
  
2
1   
  (1 +   +
 
µ
)
◆
F +
 
µ
!
LP ∗t =   M
∗
t (73)
Observe that this reduces to the expectational difference equation of the benchmark model once
again when   = 0: ✓
F 2   (2 +  )F + 1
!
LP ∗t =   M
∗
t (74)
Given the equation in (73), denote the roots of the quadratic (x2 +
✓
 κ 
2
1−    (1+  +
 
µ
)
◆
x+  
µ
)
by ✓1 and ✓2 such that:
F 2 +
✓
  
2
1   
  (1 +   +
 
µ
)
◆
F +
 
µ
= F 2   (✓1 + ✓2)F + ✓1✓2 (75)
Comparing the coefficients of each term on both sides, it is clear that:
  (✓1 + ✓2) =
  
2
1   
  (1 +   +
 
µ
) (76)
✓1✓2 =
 
µ
(77)
Without a loss of generality, I pick ✓1 = ✓ to be the smaller of the two positive roots and write
equation (73) as:
(F   ✓)LP ∗t = µ✓(1 
µ
 
✓F )−1M∗t (78)
In order to expand the negative binomial term on the right, I impose the strict assumption that:
✓µ
 
< 1 (79)
An expression for the impulse response can thus be obtained as follows:
Pt = ✓Pt−1 + µ✓
∞X
i=0
 
(
µ
 
)✓
 i
Et(Mt+i) (80)
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It is easy to see that when   = 0, the impulse response expressed in equation (80) reduces to
the original impulse response of the benchmark model as seen in Mankiw and Reis (2002):
Pt = ✓Pt−1 + (1  ✓)
2
∞X
i=0
(✓)iEt(Mt+i) (81)
where the coefficient (1 ✓)2 is given by  ✓ such that under the full rationality case when   = 0,
  =
(1  ✓)2
✓
(82)
Expressing µ and   in their original parameters, the dynamic path of prices for the -augmented
sticky-price Phillips Curve is given by:
Pt = ✓Pt−1 + (
↵ 2
1   (1   )
)✓
∞X
i=0
 
(
1   
1   (1   )
)✓
 i
Et(Mt+i) (83)
6.4 Derivation of inequality f(κ,λ)   g(κ,λ) such that a real solution for θ
exists
Begin with the equation below which rests within the square root of the quadratic formula
applied to equation (73). For a real root to be defined, the following inequality must hold:
✓
  
2
1   
  (1 +   +
 
µ
)
◆2
 
4 
µ
  0 (84)
Expanding the square and substituting for µ = ↵ 
2
1− (1− κ)
and   = ↵ 
2
1−  , I can obtain the following
inequality:
 2 
4
(1   )2
  2 (
 2
1   
)

2 +
 (  + ↵ )
1   
 
+ 4 +
4 (  + ↵ )
1   
+
 2(  + ↵ )
2
(1   )2
  (
4
1   
)

1   (1   )
 
(85)
Multiplying throughout by (1   )2 and simplifying, equation (85) can be written as:
 2 2(1 +  
2)  4  
2(1   ) + 2↵  
3(1   ) + 4↵ 2(1   ) +  3(↵2   2 2)   0 (86)
Recognising that 0 <   < 1 such that  2   0, divide the above by  2 and rearrange the equation
to obtain:
 2(1   )
2 + 2(1   )

 ↵ + 2↵  2 
 
+ ↵2 2   0 (87)
Dividing throughout by (1   )2 subsequently yields:
 2 + 2 (
↵ 
1   
) + (
↵ 
1   
)2  
4
1   
(    ↵) (88)
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This provides the expressions for f(, ) and g(, ) as seen in the text whereby
f(, ) = (  +
↵ 
1   
)2 =
✓
 (1   )k+1(1 + ⇡T )k+2
   ⇡T (1   )
+
↵ 
1   
◆2
(89)
g(, ) =
4
1   
(    ↵) =
4
1   
✓
 (1   )k+1(1 + ⇡T )k+2
   ⇡T (1   )
  ↵
◆
(90)
6.5 Derivation of the expression for a dynamic path under the κ-augmented
sticky-information Phillips Curve
I begin with the original model of price adjustment where  is first assumed to be unbounded.
This is given by:
Pt =  
∞X
j=0
(1   )jEt−j [(1  ↵)Pt + ↵Mt] (91)
This equation can be re-written as a summation of two terms as follows:
Pt =  
tX
j=0
(1   )jEt−j [(1  ↵)Pt + ↵Mt] +  
∞X
j=t+1
(1   )jEt−j [(1  ↵)Pt + ↵Mt] (92)
By expressing prices Pt in this manner, it is easy to see that Pt is now an aggregate of prices set
by price setters who are aware of the shock (fall in aggregate demand at t = 0) and those who
are not aware. The first term captures a geometrically weighted average of expectations formed
beginning from t = 0 to t = t. These are the expectations formed ex-post to the change in
aggregate demand. On the other hand, the second term captures a summation of expectations
formed of prices from the beginning of time to exactly one period before the shock occurs at
t = 0. These are the expectations formed ex-ante to the change in aggregate demand, and they
represent the prices set by price setters who are not aware of the new path of aggregate demand.
Now, suppose  is no longer 1 due to cognitive restrictions imposed by bounded rationality.
Equation (92) is then expressed as a function of  as shown below:
Pt =  
tX
j=0
(1   )jEt−j [(1  ↵)Pt + ↵Mt]
+  
X
j=t+1
(1   )jEt−j [(1  ↵)Pt + ↵Mt] +  
∞X
j=+1
'jPt−j (93)
where ' = (1    )(1 + ⇡T ). There are two important points to note when defining the limits
of the summation operator in the above manner. First, observe that the expectational terms in
the second term now sum from E−1(.) to Et−(.). To ensure that these expectations are formed
ex-ante to the shock that occurs at t = 0, the restriction of t <  is imposed. This suggests
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that price setters who are not aware of the new path of aggregate demand are now restricted
by the expectations that they formed t    periods ago in the past of prices today. The third
term captures the use of heuristics in place of expectations formed over a time horizon further
away from t   . Second, the upper bound t in the first term is smaller than  by definition
or the expectational terms now become undefined as a result of bounded rationality. Following
Mankiw and Reis (2002), the path of prices can be easily obtained such that
Pt =
8>>>><
>>>>:
−log(0.9)
✓
(1− )t+1−(1− )κ+1
◆
+ 
∞X
j=+1
'jPt−j
1−(1−↵)
✓
1−(1− )t+1
◆ for t < 
If  is equal to 10, then prices from t = 0 to t = 9 thus follow the path outlined above.
What happens when t > ? It is clear that prices can no longer follow the specified path outlined
above, or they violate the expectational constraints imposed by equation (93). As a result, an
alternative path for prices is required for all t > . I rewrite equation (93) in the following
manner instead:
Pt =  
X
j=0
(1   )jEt−j [(1  ↵)Pt ++↵Mt] +  
∞X
j=+1
'jPt−j (94)
The first term represents price setters who are aware of the new path of aggregate demand and
form ex-ante expectations of Pt and Mt contemporaneously up to  periods ago. When t > ,
price setters with old information are now represented by the second term. In this world there
are no longer price setters who set prices according to past information because the time horizon
now prohibits the formation of expectations. Instead, these price setters who are not aware of
the new path are left with the choice of simply referring to past prices Pt−j as an convenient
anchor. Hence, the above equation can be written as:
Pt = Pt(1  ↵)[1  (1   )
+1] +  
∞X
j=+1
'jPt−j (95)
Denoting ! = 1  (1  ↵)[1  (1   )+1] to be a constant for a given , I can further rearrange
the above equation as follows:
Pt =
 
!
∞X
j=+1
'jPt−j (96)
Taking out the first term and redefining the summation operator, equation (88) can be expressed
as:
Pt =
 
!
'+1Pt−−1 + '
✓
 
!
∞X
j=+1
'jPt−j−1
◆
(97)
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Recognising that the second term in parenthesis above is equivalent to Pt−1, the above equation
can be expressed as a difference equation given by
Pt = ⇣Pt−−1 + 'Pt−1 (98)
where ⇣ =  
!
'+1 is a constant. Here, I see that the path of prices from t >  is now dependent
fully on some weighted average of prices set one period ago and the furthest possible prices set
up at  periods ago. Noting a discontinuity of prices at t = , the desired paths of prices under
policy experiment 1 is thus given by:
Pt =
8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
−log(0.9)
✓
(1− )t+1−(1− )κ+1
◆
+ 
∞X
j=+1
'jPt−j
1−(1−↵)
✓
1−(1− )t+1
◆ for t    1
⇣Pt−−1 + 'Pt−1 if t > 
For policy experiment 2, all ex-ante expectations Et−jPt where t j < 0 are equal to 0.025(t+1).
Therefore, the desired path of prices are given by:
Pt =
8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
0.025(t+1)
✓
(1− )t+1−(1− )κ+1
◆
+ 
∞X
j=+1
'jPt−j
1−(1−↵)
✓
1−(1− )t+1
◆ for t    1
⇣Pt−−1 + 'Pt−1 if t > 
To solve for an impulse response under policy experiment 3, equation (93) is written as follows:
Pt =  
t+8X
j=0
(1   )jEt−j [(1  ↵)Pt + ↵Mt]
+  
+8X
j=t+9
(1   )jEt−j [(1  ↵)Pt + ↵Mt] +  
∞X
j=+9
'jPt−j (99)
Observe that the limits of the summation operators are written in a way such that all ex-
ante expectations are formed before period t =  8. For all t   j <  8, Et−jPt = Et−jMt =
0.025(1 + t). These are inattentive price setters who are not aware of the announcement of
forthcoming disinflation at period t = 0. For all t   j    8, there are no uncertainty given
the announcement. Price setters who are aware of the new path of prices thus set ex-post
expectations such that Et−jPt = Pt. Therefore, for t < , prices follow the path given by:
Pt =
0.025(t+ 1)(1   )t+9
✓
1  (1   )−t
◆
+  
∞X
j=+9
'jPt−j
1  (1  ↵)
✓
1  (1   )t+9
◆ (100)
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For t > k, equation (96) can be written instead as:
Pt =
 
⌘
∞X
j=+9
'jPt−j (101)
which can subsequently be written as a difference equation as follows:
Pt =
 
⌘
'+9Pt−−9 + 'Pt−1 (102)
where ⌘ = 1  (1  ↵)(1  (1   )t+9).
6.6 Derivation of impulse responses for inflation in response to monetary
policy shocks
6.6.1 Impulse responses for the -augmented sticky-price new Keynesian Phillips
Curve
I begin by writing the growth of money supply Mt as an AR(1) process as follows
∆Mt = ⇢∆Mt−1 + ✏t (103)
where ✏t is a white-noise innovation. Under this model, the level of money supply is non-
stationary but the growth rate of money supply is stationary for all|⇢| < 1. Given this conjecture,
inflation follows a stationary process as Ill. The AR(1) process for inflation and prices can
equivalently be written as a MA(1) process as follows:
⇡t =
∞X
j=0
⇢j✏t−j (104)
Pt =
∞X
⌧=0
∞X
j=0
 j✏t−j−⌧ (105)
Then, recall that the path of prices solved previously in subsection 4.3 is given by:
Pt = ✓Pt−1 + µ✓
∞X
i=0
 
(
µ
 
)✓
 i
Et(Mt+i) (106)
Substituting the MA(1) process for Pt into this solution yields:
∞X
⌧=0
∞X
j=0
 j✏t−j−⌧ = ✓
∞X
⌧=0
∞X
j=0
 j✏t−1−j−⌧ + µ✓
∞X
i=0
 
(
µ
 
)✓
 i ∞X
j=0
∞X
⌧=max{i−j,0}
⇢j✏t+i−j−⌧ (107)
as Et{✏t+i−j−⌧} = ✏t+i−j−⌧ for all i   j  ⌧ and is zero otherwise. Subsequently,  j are
coefficients to be determined. Using the same method of undetermined coefficients outlined by
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Mankiw and Reis (2002),    can be solved by matching the coefficients on ✏t−  on both sides of
the equation such that:
 X
j=0
 j = ✓
 −1X
j=0
 j + µ✓
∞X
i=0
((
µ
 
)✓
 i  +iX
j=0
⇢j (108)
The above equation can subsequently be simplified to yield {  }, the impulse response of infla-
tion in response to monetary policy shocks.
   = (✓   1)
 −1X
j=0
 j + (
µ✓
1  ⇢
)
✓
1
1  µ
 
✓
 
⇢ +1
1  µ
 
✓⇢
◆
(109)
Once again, observe that if  =1, µ =   and the above impulse function reduces to that of the
benchmark given by
   = (✓   1)
 −1X
j=0
 j +
(1  ✓)2
1  ⇢
✓
1
1  ✓
 
⇢ +1
1  ✓⇢
◆
(110)
6.6.2 Impulse responses for the -augmented sticky-information Phillips Curve
Similar to that for the sticky-price model, I begin by first defining a process for money and
prices as follows:
Mt =
∞X
%=0
∞X
i=0
⇢i✏t−i−% (111)
∆Mt =
∞X
i=0
⇢i✏t−i (112)
Pt =
∞X
%=0
∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−i−% (113)
⇡t =
∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−i (114)
Substituting the above processes into the -augmented sticky-information Phillips Curve out-
lined by equation (11) in the text yields:
∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−i = (
↵ 
1  ↵
)
✓ ∞X
%=0
∞X
i=0
⇢i✏t−i−%  
∞X
%=0
∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−i−%
◆
+
 
X
j=0
(1   )jEt−j−1
✓
(1  ↵)
∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−i + ↵
∞X
i=0
⇢i✏t−i
◆
+
 
∞X
j=+1
'j
✓ ∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−i−j + (
 
1   
)
∞X
%=0
∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−j−i−%
◆
(115)
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To obtain an expression for the impulse response {Ψ }, all coefficients of the white noise inno-
vation ✏t−  must be matched. However, note that the upper bound of the second term in the
above expression is now changed to , when it was 1 in the original sticky-information Phillips
Curve. This results in a discontinuity of the moment of inflation between   =  and   = + 1.
Now, consider what happens when    . Firstly, the last term in the above expression no
longer exists. Secondly, taking expectation Et−j−1(✏t−i) yields ✏t−j−i if and only if i   j + 1.
Subsequently, the impulse response {Ψ } from past expectations only exists for all     as it
is only possible to replace the upper bound of the summation operator  by   if this constrain
is satisfied. Redefining the summation operator such that j = i  1, the coefficients of ✏t−  are
thus given by:
Ψ  = (
↵ 
1   
)
✓  X
i=0
⇢i  
 −1X
i=0
Ψi  Ψ 
◆
+ (
 
1   
)
✓  X
i=0
(1   )i   1
◆
Ψ +
(
↵ 
1  ↵
)
 X
i=1
(1   )i⇢  (116)
What happens then, if     ? The impulse response arising from past expectations of inflation
no longer exists now, as it is no longer possible to replace the upper bound  with  . Subse-
quently, all moments of inflation today will only arise from output, past inflation and some past
prices. Now, consider the following innovation arising from past inflation given by:
 
∞X
j=+1
'j
✓ ∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−i−j
◆
For there to be a ✏t−  term to feature in the above expression, there must be a restriction such
that i+ j =  . Satisfying this restriction implies that the coefficients of all ✏t−  terms are given
by Ψ −j . By redefining the summation operator using this restriction, it is possible to rewrite
all coefficients of ✏t−  embedded in the above expression as:
 
1   
 −−1X
i=0
' −i+1Ψi (117)
Similarly, consider the innovation to current inflation arising from past prices given by:
 
∞X
j=+1
'j
✓
(
 
1   
)
∞X
%=0
∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−j−i−%
◆
All coefficients on ✏t−  terms embedded in the summation
∞X
%=0
∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−j−i−% are given by
 −jX
i=0
Ψi
with the restriction j+ i =  . The impulse responses arising from past prices are thus given by:
 2
1   
 X
j=+1
'j
✓  −jX
i=0
Ψi
◆
(118)
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Using equations (117) and (118), the coefficients of ✏t−  are thus given by:
Ψ  = (
↵ 
1   
)
✓  X
i=0
⇢i  
 −1X
i=0
Ψi  Ψ 
◆
+
 
1   
 −−1X
i=0
' −i+1Ψi+
 2
1   
 X
j=+1
'j
✓  −jX
i=0
Ψi
◆
(119)
Therefore, the complete characterization of the stochastic process for inflation as seen in the
text is given by:
Ψ  =
↵ 

(1 
 −1X
i=0
Ψi) +
 X
i=1
⇢i + ⇢ 
 X
i=1
(1   )i
 
1   (1  ↵)
 X
i=0
(1   )i
for     (120)
Ψ  =
↵ 

(1 
 −1X
i=0
Ψi) +
 X
i=1
⇢i
 
+Π
1   (1  ↵)
for     + 1 (121)
where Π =  
 −−1X
i=0
' −i+1Ψi +  
2
 X
j=+1
'j
✓  −jX
i=0
Ψi
◆
What happens if  = 0? Then, the stochastic process for inflation given by equation (115) is
written instead as:
∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−i = (
↵ 
1  ↵
)
✓ ∞X
%=0
∞X
i=0
⇢i✏t−i−%  
∞X
%=0
∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−i−%
◆
+
 Et−1
✓
(1  ↵)
∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−i + ↵
∞X
i=0
⇢i✏t−i
◆
+
 
∞X
j=1
'j
✓ ∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−i−j + (
 
1   
)
∞X
%=0
∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−j−i−%
◆
(122)
Realising that Et−1(✏t−i) = ✏t−i for all i   1 and 0 otherwise, the above equation can be
expressed as:
∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−i = (
↵ 
1  ↵
)
✓ ∞X
%=0
∞X
i=0
⇢i✏t−i−%  
∞X
%=0
∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−i−%
◆
+
 
✓
(1  ↵)
∞X
i=1
Ψi✏t−i + ↵
∞X
i=1
⇢i✏t−i
◆
+
 
∞X
j=1
'j
✓ ∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−i−j + (
 
1   
)
∞X
%=0
∞X
i=0
Ψi✏t−j−i−%
◆
(123)
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Matching once again the coefficients on all ✏tυ terms, the impulse response {Ψ } for inflation
when  = 0 is given as follows:
Ψ  =
↵ 

(1 
 −1X
i=0
Ψi) +
 X
i=1
⇢i + ⇢ 
 X
i=1
(1   )i
 
1   (1  ↵)
 X
i=0
(1   )i
for     (124)
Ψ  =
↵ 

(1 
 −1X
i=0
Ψi) +
 X
i=1
⇢i + (1   )⇢ 
 
+ Γ
1 + (1  ↵)( 2   2 )
for     + 1 (125)
Such that Ψ0 =
↵ (2− )
1+(1−↵)( 2−2 )
and Γ = (1   ) 
 −1X
i=0
' −iΨi +  
2
 X
j=1
'j
✓  −jX
i=0
Ψi
◆
.
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